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STRUCTuRES FOR 
DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMEl'."T 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is designed to assist the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater 
Winnipeg in the formulation of proposals for a development corporation by 
presenting a description and appraisal of the organizational methods 
employed by a variety of North American cities in undertaking projects of 
downtown development. 
In recent years, several cities, particularly those in the United States, 
have experimented with different forms of urban development organizations 
in order to provide for a more effective, efficient and productive renewal of 
downtown areas. This new generation of development organizations were fostered 
by the increasing need to overcome inter-governmentai confusions, enlist 
active participation of the community, implement a more comprehensive 
development program, draw upon a wide variety of financial resources and 
avoid the delays and red tape that often plague urban development efforts. 
Hopefully, this study, by recording and analyzing these experiences can shed 
light on ways and means of constructing an innovative and effective organi-
zation for the carrying out of the Greater Winnipeg Metropolitan Corporation 
Downtown Plan. 
It is true that each city is unique ~~d that institutions and practices cannot 
be precisely adapted from one city to the next. But, it is equally true 
that many problems or conditions are common to urban environments. Other 
cities' efforts to forge more effective instruments for urban development 
thus provide useful lessons to be employed in the Winnipeg situation. 
The actual terms of reference for this study are laid out in a proposal 
submitted to the Chairman of Metro Council (attached as appendix I). The 
organization of this study consists of a series of short case studies which 
will highlight facets of different cities' development activities, followed 
by a breakdown of specific aspects of development organizations, drawn from 
the combined evidence of the case studies and concluding with an assessment 
of those features of development organizations that should be especially noted 
in creating such a body to promote Winnipeg's downtown development. 
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PHILADELPHIA DEVELOPMENT 
(Population 2~015,000 - 1969) 
Philade~?~ia is a well-recognized pioneer in the art of downtown develop-
ment. The particular merits of the Philadelphia approach has rested in 
a talent for promotion, the enlistment of prominent business leaders in 
the redevelopment effort and efficiency in implementation. The manner in 
which this has been achieved is highly instructive. 
Mr. Edmund Bacon, until a few weeks ago the head of planning for 
Philadelphia, in an interview, expressed the view that the first require-
ment in a successful development operation is to establish a clear 
image of what the project would accomplish and then attract wide scale 
public support. 1 In 1948, the Greater Philadelphia Movement, a private group of citizens interested in the regeneration of Philadelphia, was 
formed and it adopted as a priority the downtown development of the city. 
Such devices as a scale model of a new Philadelphia downtown placed in a 
large department store were used to attract wide-spread interest in the 
proposal. Out of the Greater Philadelphia Movement grew both political 
reform forces and a new series of institutions to spark development. 
Thus, the initiatives for redevelopment in Philadelphia began with a 
base of citizen support, particularly the business community, and this 
has continued to characterize on-going efforts in the city. 
The structures that now move Philadelphia renewal are a combination of 
public and private bodies which work together in a highly integrated 
fashion. The first is the Planning Commission which originates the plans. 
The second is the Redevelopment Authority which is charged with im-
plementation. The third is the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, 
composed entirely of private individuals which acts as a powerful pressure 
and support group for development and in effect is the real moving force. 
The construction of the two government agencies reflects the American 
pattern of delegating a high degree of autonomy, and a wide range of 
powers. They are responsible each to separate citizen boards, the members 
of which are appointed by the mayor. The staff members are not part of 
the municipal civil service, have a good deal of independence from the 
line agencies of city government, and operate far more as business corpo-
rations than is normal in local government agencies. 
The third part of the triangle, the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation 
is the most unique of the institutions. Its governing board of 46 members 
is composed of the top executives of the major financial, industrial and 
commercial institutions in the city. One could call it an institutionalized 
power elite. The Old Philadelphia Development Corporation has no formal 
role other than that of an "unpaid consultant" to the Philadelphia Re-
development Authority and Planning Commission. But its actual position 
is an extremely influential one. 
1. Interview with Edmund Bacon, Philadelphia City Hall, Feb. 24, 1970. 
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Bill Rafsky, the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation's Executive 
Vice President describes its role in various ways. It is a catalyst for 
getting ~~~ewal started, arranging finances and negotiating with potential 
developers. It serves as a liaison between government and private 
enterprise and insures that the development project is feasible and 
workable from both points of view. In fact, most of the major decisions 
on development in Philadelphia are taken in full consultation with the 
Old Philadelphia Development Corporation and with its acquiescence. Its 
Executive Vice President sits as an ex-officio member on the Boards of 
both the Planning Commission and Redevelopment Authority, and is in daily 
contact with their officials. In some cases the Old Philadelphia Develop-
ment Corporation has acted as an actual deleloper, as it did in the Society 
Hill area where it marketed rehabilitated homes and it has recently 
taken over the actual development of the wharf area of the city. ~ormally, 
through, it acts as an informal, but highly influential expediter of 
development programmes forming an essential link between private and public 
operations. 
The value of the O.P.D.C. is obvious. It mobilizes the power and resources 
of the business community. It insures that plans and development pro-
posals are realistic and fit the needs and desires of the business 
community. It undertakes certain initiatives that a goverlli~ent agency 
cannot, thus imparting a flexibility to the development process. It points 
to the essential requirement for creating some vehicle whereby the private 
community participates in the planning and implementation of a development 
project. This has been a major key to the success of the Philadelphia 
Redevelopment experience. 
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ROSTON: URBAN REDEVELOPME~L CORPORATIONS 
(Population 570,000 - 1969) 
The fir5~ ~uteresting aspect of Boston's development program is the 
provision under Massachusetts State Law (General Laws- State of Mass., 
Chapter 121A) for the creation of Urban Development Corporations. This 
law provides for the establishment of private corporations, initiated by 
three people who, on application to the Boston Redevelopment Authority. 
may undertake projects of development, construction or rehabilitation of 
commercial, residential. industrial property. 
These projects must be considered to be in the public interest, fit the 
plan for the city, and respond to other minor conditions set out by the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority. Financing for such corporations can be 
obtained through issuance of capital stock, or from grants, gifts, loans 
from public or private agencies. One of the important provisions is that 
stock in such corporations must first be offered to owners of property 
in the project area. 
The Urban Development Corporations are given certain important incentives. 
They are exempt from all municipal and state taxation for a period of 
forty years, except for an annual excise of 5% of gross income plus $10 
per $1000 of property valuation. The corporations are also able to use 
the government powers of eminent domain. In return for these and other 
privileges there is a 6% maximum dividend limit on any return from 
investment. 
The exercise of this Urban Development Corporation legislation has been 
responsible for several of Boston's major redevelopment projects, including 
Prudential Center, a massive multi-$1,000,000 commercial redevelopment 
project, sponsored by Prudential Life under provisions of 121A. 
The relevance of this procedure lies in its exemplifying how under covering 
legislation, the development of a downtown area or parts of it can be 
handled by a separate private corporation using certain public powers, working 
under general conditions and plans set by public authorities. This avoids 
problems of trying to combine various levels of government or a variety 
of interested parties under such an arrangement. The separate quasi public-
private corporations have a freedom to undertake the task in the most 
efficacious manner possible. 
It also means that the Boston Redevelopment Authority acquires a freedom 
and flexibility,as these development corporations can undertake projects 
that government may not be able to, but which will still fit into an 
overall plan. It also means that large institutions, such as Prudential, 
can be convinced to become a major sponsor of part of a development plan 
and arranging financing. Of course, the provisions for special financial 
inducements and possession of powers of land assembly are critical. Such 
an arrangement only works~ however, when there is sufficient interest and 
ability in the private arena to take on such a job. 
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NEI,;ARK, NEW JERSEY 
(Population 400,000 - 1969) 
Newark is ~ relatively small city in area (23 square miles) faced with 
the problems of urban blight and a movement of middle-class people out 
of the city leaving space for rising numbers of poor Negro immigrants. 
In the 1940's the city, acting under State of New Jersey enabling 
legislation formed a publicCQrporation, called the Newark Housing Authority 
(~liA). The NHA has been noted over the last 20 years for its massive 
work in both urban renewal, housing and commercial redevelopment. Using 
local and federal funds as well as encouraging privately developed pro-
jects, the l1HA had, by 1960, sparked renewal of about 300 city blocks, 
one-sixth of which were devoted to college, office and industrial uses. 
Most of this development was arranged without recourse to any detailed 
overall city plan. 
Between 1964 and 1978 the ~lfA proposed to shift its emphasis considerably 
to provide for an increase in available office space in the downtown 
area. Projects totalling 8.4 million square feet of new office space 
were proposed and the total public-private investment in the area by 
1975 was estimated to rise to over $1,000,000,000. It was estimated 
that by this date well over one-sixth of the city would have been rebuilt 
under the impetus of the NHA. 
The structure of the ~lfA is basically two-tiered. The executive director 
is primarily a "bridge" between the organization, the city officials, 
federal renewal agencies and the local businessmen's committee, the 
GreaterNewark Development Council. The technical and planning aspects of 
the organization are handled by a development administrator. 
Clearance policy is not dictated by bargaining with local interests. 
Stress in the organization has been laid upon the need to begin projects 
rather than achieve political consensus. The task of alleviating and 
representing local concerns is left to the city officials and to the 
Development Council. Most bargaining over sites, projects and financing 
is done·with developers, federal officials and to some extent with city 
officials. Financing for the NHA itself has come from federal subsidies, 
rent from projects and bonds. 
The success of the NHA in carrying on such an ambitious program has been 
due to many factors. One is the permissive mood of the city, which in 
the 1940's was faced with a critical problem of commercial and residential 
decay. A second factor has been the insulation of the NHA from the con-
flicting interests of the population. Thirdly, the leadership of the 
executive director, Louis Danzig, has been critical in the acquisition of 
necessary funds and investment. Coincident with this leadership factor 
has been the high quality of the NHA staff. A final factor has been the 
wide range of approval powers vested in the WrlA. It has been able to 
approach investors as a single approving agency, thus cutting down delays 
and uncertainty in the formulation of projects. 
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NEW YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
The Urb~~ ~evelopment Corporation of the State of New York was established 
in April, 1968.1 It has the most extensive and all-encompassing sets of powers held by any of the new generation of urban development agencies; 
and is charged with a broad-ranging set of objectives, ranging from the 
construction of low-cost housing to the planning, financing, construction 
and administration of industrial and commercial development. 
The powers held by the Corporation enable it to condemn and clear land 
and relocate displacees; it is exempted from municipal permit granting 
powers and municipalities are prohibited from modifying plans or drawings. 
Most significantly, the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) can waive 
local laws, ordinances, zoning codes, charters, substituting compliance 
with the state's own building construction code. The UDC also has the 
auxiliary powers to create corporations and/or gtve money to subsidiaries, 
enter into contracts for purchase,lease, sale or mortgage of property and 
issue general revenue or project secured bonds. Its major source of 
financing is the issuance of tax exempt public bonds for which it has a 
$1 billion authorization. In sum, the real innovative character of the 
UDC lies in the underlying concept of a multi-purpose public authority 
empowered to act out any or all of the roles associated with urban develop-
ment from land acquisition to management. It thus can act as promoter, 
financier, consultant and developer; and through these powers is able 
to overcome the time lag and red tape difficulties normally encountered 
in development activities. 
The line of responsibility for UDC lies with a small Board of Directors 
composed of 5 private individuals appointed by the Governor, and 4 state 
officials, again emphasizing the American pattern of creating develop-
ment authorities outside of direct control by an elected body. There is 
also a business advisory council and there is power to establish a series 
of community advisory committees on the local level. The president of 
the corporation is the chief executive officer, also appointed by the 
governor. The individual holding that position is Mr. Edward Logue, who 
won fame as the sparkplug behind development in New Haven and Boston. 
This again emphasizes the critical importance of the man who must make 
the operation move. Logue won his reputation through his ability to 
overcome innumerable hurdles - both political and otherwise, and to skill-
fully deal with government officials and businessmen alike. 
In terms of actual undertakings, the UDC is presently involved in the 
residential and commercial redevelopment of Welfare Island, a choice 147 
acre land site lying off Manhattan, in the placement of low-cost housing 
in suburbs, and in the building of several new towns. Thus far, it has 
not engendered major conflict with municipalities, and has entered 
communities with their invitation. As one official commented, however, 
the powerful package of tools possessed by the UDC is a persuasive reason 
for municipalities to be co-operative. The extensive powers have an 
effect, even though they need not be used. 
1. New York Urban Development Corporation Act, p. 6257 
1. ibid., p. 6266 
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The relevance of UDC has several facets. The first is demonstration of 
an approach to urban development that goes beyond a specific project and 
covers a jurisdiction wider than a metropolitan area. The capacity of 
a senior level of government to set up a multi-purpose agency for urban 
development and to endow such an agency with wide ranging independent 
powers is not without its dangers. But~ it does point to the seriousness 
with which the problems of urban development are considered, and the 
extent to which measures are required to overcome the conventional 
institutional, legal, regulatorJ arrangements. To quote from an assess-
ment of UDC by two American planning experts 
"The lJDC represents the latest stage in a movement 
which began with the government as regulator~ under-
writer and insurer and now features the state in 
active partnership with citizens and corporations. 
Government as 'packager' of developmental activities 
is a new genre of positive public enterprise."3 
Furthermore, the UDC accents the increasing reliance on corporations 
that have self-contained powers of finance, land control planning and 
expropriation. governed by boards of directors appointed by government, 
outside the normal channels of responsibility. tied in with private 
advisory boards. 
Other noteworthy elements of the UDC are the obvious felt needs to 
eliminate conventional rules, zoning and building codes, and to over-
come jurisdictional problems. The conclusion is that the UDC is an 
instrument of potentially great speed and efficiency with the capacity 
to totally manage, plan, conceive, finance and manage large scale develop-
ments. 
3. William Rally, "The State Urban Development Corporation", S.J. Schulman 
Yuk's, The Urban Lawyer, Summer 1969, Volume 1, No. 2. 
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D~"VER 
(Population 480,000 - 1969) 
In the mid 1950's, Denver, a city in many respects similar to Winnipeg, 
was faced with a decaying central business district and no tail buildings 
to express any urban dynamism. In 1953 steps were taken to change the 
pattern of urban deterioration by renovating the civic auditorium and 
building a new civic library and a convention center. In 1955 a group 
of concerned businessmen formed Downtown Denver Incorporated to promote 
the uplifting of the central business district. Another group was formed 
in 1955, the Dowr.town Improvement Association, composed of retailers, 
owners, users and managers of downtown property but it proved to be too 
large (it represented 176 firms) to function effectively. In 1961 an 
ordinance of the Denver City Council established the Master Plan Committee. 
This organization was part public and part private because it was financed 
half by the city and half by private subscription. The mayor nominated 
committee members (20) whose purpose was to formulate a "Development 
Guide for Downtown Denver". The purpose of having a semi-private agency 
was to enlist the participation of the civic and business elite in urban 
planning, but the help of Denver's top business leadership was not 
forthcoming as it had been in St. Louis, Detroit or Philadelphia. 
Denver's main problem is still the lack of leadership because of the 
fragmentation of activity surrounding urban redevelopment. Besides the 
Master Plan Committee, or the Downtown Development Improvement Association 
many other public and private leaders are involved in urban redevelopment. 
The Downtown Denver Urban Renewal Authority is an independent local agency 
with the power of eminent domain. It is composed of an advisory board 
appointed by the mayor and finds 1/3 of its financing from the city and 
2/3 from the federal government. Its purpose is planning and urban renewal. 
The Governor's Council on Economic Development is a state body made of 
businessmen appointed by the governor whose role is to attract industry 
to the state. Forward Metro Denver Incorporated is a child of the Chamber 
of Commerce whose aim is to attract new industry and expand existing 
enterprise in Denver. Finally we have the Denver Planning Board, another 
city agency to handle comprehensive planning. 
The private development in Denver has been undertaken mostly by outside 
investors such as New York's William Zechendorf who handled the $16 million, 
22 floor Mile High Center office building with 574,000 gross square 
feet of floor space, the Murchison interests of Texas who developed the 
$10 million, 28 floor First National Bank and the Brooks Tower Syndicate. 
Now with a population of 480,000, Denver is still faced with the absence 
of spiritual and co-ordinated leadership and is now grappling with the 
great problems of urban transportation and parking. 
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ST. LOUIS 
(Population 665,000 - 1969) 
St. Loui~ ~~th a population of 665~000 in 1969 is experiencing~ similar 
to many other cities in this study a population loss to the suburbs. 
The remaining downtown is trying to rebuild where obsolete transportation 
facilities and buildings remain. In beginning downtown redevelopment, the 
Mayor, A. Kaufmann, experienced great difficulty in attracting the interest 
of private developers. Generally, the public as well as the other 
political leaders, were apathetic to any major attempt at downtown re-
development. The initial problem was one of finding leadership. 
The problem of leadership was attacked in 1953 by the establishment of 
Civic Progress Incorporated. Civic Progress Incorporated was created 
by a group of concerned businessmen and civic leaders to act as a 
catalyst in redeveloping downtown St. Louis. The role of this organization 
is one of public relations. The members. being St. Louis Civic and business 
elite appear at fund raising and educational functions that are promoting 
urban redevelopment. Tnere is no delegation of responsibility and there 
is no sub-organization or staff beyond the influential top business and 
civic leaders. They have been especially successful in promoting successful 
bond drives for development projects. 
But as well as the problem of leadership in St. Louis, was the problem 
of making urban development attractive in terms of profitability to 
private developers. Tnis second problem was solved by passage in the 
Missouri State Legislature Law "that allowed private organizations tax 
benefits and the power of eminent domain to handle downtown redevelopment. 
Corporations undertaking the Act must be organized "to serve a public 
purpose" and everything they build must promote the public health, safety 
and welfare." Corporations are allowed an 8 per cent annual return on 
their investments, are operated entirely by private interests but remain 
accountable to the city for approval of plans. A redevelopment corporation 
may function only in an area designated blighted by the City Board of 
Aldermen and continuing approval of budgets and plans is required. 
In 1951 the pioneer Urban Redevelopment Corporation, a private group 
established under the new legislation, developed a 14 acre slum area just 
off St. Louis' business district called Plaza Square. This project re-
sulted in the construction of an office building, six middle class 
apartment towers and a two acre park. In spite of the tax advantages 
offered to the redevelopment corporation, a one million dollar tax gain 
will have been realized after 25 years. 
A second private group, the Civic Centre Redevelopment Corporation was 
established to handle the $89 million sports stadium (Busch Memorial 
Stadium) and other associated projects. T.~is corporation worked in 
conjunction with the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority. a public 
body created by t~e state of Missouri to assist in the redevelopment 
efforts of any city of over 350,000 people in Missouri. This public 
body consists of five commissioners appointed by the mayor, who acquire 
land and dispose of i~ ~o private redevelopment corporations. This body 
is tne o~e t~a~ ?rovides ?ubl~c scrutiny over private efforts made at 
urban redevelopme~c 
ll 
MINNEAPOLIS 
The Downtown Council, a non-profit private organization that works 
primarily with the private sector, but in close contact with city, 
country and state governments, is spearheading urban development in 
Minneapolis. It was created in 1955 to fill a need for an organization 
to develop, co-ordinate and promote commercial and civic growth in 
the central business district, to promote a steady growth of the metro-
polis and to make the downtown area a vital economic force. The Council 
assumes these general objectives and also more specific aims such as 
building the Nicollet Mall complex, and the implementation of certain 
transportation and parking plans. Mr. 0. D. Gay, executive vice president 
of the Downtown Council, sees its role as that of a "catalyst". 
"We are instrumental in getting people to do 
things for their city and in getting city people 
to implement the various projects our Board 
determines to be worthwhile." 
The Council has a 24 member board of directors, one third of which are 
elected each year. The council is broken down into committees such as the 
Beautification Committee, the Retail Committee, the Nicollet Avenue Task 
Force, the Hennepin Avenue Task Force and the Traffic and Transportation 
Task Force. The members are all businessmen that receive no salary (only 
the executive vice-president is salaried). 
The Downtown Council is in effect a pressure group of donwtown business-
men providing leadership and acting as a self-described catalyst in 
public and private efforts at downtown redevelopment. Its immediate 
goals as stated by Mr. Gay are the improvement of urban transportation 
and parking close to the central business district. 
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C&~IAN EXPERIENCE 
Canadian experience in urban redevelopment has not produced the same 
diversity of organizational and legal structures as have been noted 
in the United States. This is due partly to the fact that urban problems 
have been viewed with less concern than in the U.S.A., and because of 
the limited experiences with urban renewal. 
The structure of federal-provincial relations in regard to urban develop-
ment are fundamentally similar to those of the U.S.A. The provinces are 
the key to urban development, since they control the activities of the 
cities. The federal government may provide monetary support for programs 
inaugurated by cities or development agencies in both countries. 
The most common forms of urban development organizations in Canada are 
related directly to local government bodies or are private corporations. 
Hamilton's Civic Square and Centennial Beach projects were both promoted 
through city agencies. Place Ville Marie and similar developments in 
Halifax, Vancouver and Winnipeg have come about through the efforts of 
private developers working with the city or metropolitan agencies. Public 
development agencies are definitely not used with the frequency found in 
the United States. The corporation founded to promote the construction 
of the Centennial Concert Hall complex in Winnipeg seems to be a major 
exception, and its scope is quite narrow in terms of the development 
needs in the city. 
Housing and urban renewal has tended also to remain a function of the 
city bureaucracy across Canada. Many provinces have set up provincial 
housing authorities but these all appear to be concentrated on the 
financing aspects of residential construction. In the U.S.A. such 
organizations have tended towards the expansion of their powers into 
urban renewal and downtown development, but this trend has not so far 
been established in Canada. The experience in Canada thus far has not 
been to experiment with new forms of organization, but to treat re-
development as similar to other government functions, handled by a line 
department. There is also an apparently greater reluctance to give more 
autonomy to development agencies, and to maintain tight political control. 
There is also no experience in setting up agencies that cross juris-
dictional lines. 
The present results of this experience, in Canadian cities, according to 
Dr. Robert Collier of the University of British Columbia School of 
Planning, who is completing a study of commercial urban development 
projects across Canada, are exactly similar to those that prompted 
American cities to seek new answers. There is no authority with central 
decision-making powers; various jurisdictions of governmenti apply different 
rules and regulations. There is little rapport with the downtown business 
community. There is an uncertainty in finance. There is undue inter-
ference from elected councils. This adds up to serious time lags, which 
become expensive and costly, a sense of frustration which discourages 
private developers, and a lack of clear-cut responsibility by any 
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organization with sufficient powers to make decisions and have them 
carried through. The conclusion reached in Dr. Collier's study is 
that certainly some form of consolidated development organizations with 
sufficient powers, finance and autonomy to move quickly and with 
precision is seriously required to undertake the kind of revitalization 
required in the center city areas of Canadian cities. 1 
1. Interview with Dr. Robert Collier - Winnipeg, March 2, 1970. 
Note: 
Tnese case studies are not the only evidence upon which the succeeding 
analysis and conclusions are based. For example, material drawn from 
the experiences of New Haven, Baltimore, Pittsburgh and Chicago was 
also examined. However, their experience is similar to points made 
in the above case studies, therefore a full description of their 
activity was not included, although will be drawn upon in the analysis. 
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I ADMINISTRF~IVE CONCEPTS 
A PURPOSE 
The earliest urban development corporations have been private in nature 
and have been traditionally concerned alm~st solely with the optimization 
of profits. This narrow purpose has emphasized the devotion of land 
and construction to "productive" pursuits, neglecting the social environ-
ment which has disrupted by the development and often strained by the 
new construction. 
Once public agencies were formed to promote urb~~ development including 
slum renewal, their models were the projects constructed by private 
agencies. Urb~• renewal in New York City in the 1940's and 1950's for 
inst~•ce was sparked by Robert ~~ses, using his concept of narrow purpose 
activity. Moses opposed overall city planning, preferring to concentrate 
his energies on development projects which over time would·hopefully 
dovetail into a better city. His primary concern was with rapid execution 
of projects. with a minimal concern for the social tensions and disruption 
caused by development. Agencies in Newark and Philadelphia moved closer 
to comprehensive planning with social concern in the 1950's. 
With the development of systems analysis techniques in the 1960's it 
became apparent that "productive" investments and hidden "social" costs 
often occurred together, to the detriment of the social environment of the 
developed area. The concept of narrow purpose development has increasingly 
come under criticism. Comprehensive physical and social planning has 
encouraged development agencies to expand into multi-purpose organizations, 
devoted to the total development of project areas. Relocation of services, 
social amenities and family services have been either added to the 
responsibilities of development agencies or have been closely co-ordinated 
with the work of these agencies. 
Much of the concern for social development has also emerged from the 
experience of development agencies in the United States which began as 
organizations devoted to the replacement of slums by low-cost public 
housing. The failure of many public housing projects to change the 
attitudes of slum dwellers forced a concern for the broader social 
matrix upon these agencies. In many areas the task of downtown commercial 
development was grafted onto the public housing agency, which has become 
the predominant form of public development agency in the U.S.A. Experience 
with slu~ society has thus contributed to the "humanizing" of commercial 
develop::.ent. 
The activity of redevelopment was also recognized to be one that involved 
a good number of interests. It became obvious in the experience of urban 
renewal that development only worked well when it was acceptable to the 
private community. Downtown development would work only when the commercial 
&~d financial interests which have the greatest s~&<e in the downtown, as 
well as the wider cornsunity believe it in their interests to become in-
vo~ved and have an active participation in the evolution of the plan and 
·::~:e p:=o~ ec t <I> :.nc:reasingly 5 tl"1erefore) ·t:'1e purpose of such organiz2tions 
~iaS ~w2e.rl .:.:o enlist t:1-.:.e i~vol,le:::.e:r.;.t: o=: t:1.e Co~:,r.::tow-n com::1unity and str·Gctt:.re 
2,22.ns f.o:r ~£-.1.e:..r c.on·tin.ei:."lg par·:icipation i:: t:"le ?:...ar~:'~ir:.g and execution of 
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In assessing purposes of the organization then, two considerations are 
necessary. First, the scope of the organization from a single-shot 
enterprise to a more encompassing organization. Second, the extent 
of involvement of the private community. The experience of the American 
cities has been to expand the dimension of both. Organizations are 
becoming more multi-purpose, and designed to involve a wide range of 
community interests. This is accomplished either by having older 
institutions evolve into multi-purpose agencies or through the creation 
of new forms of development corporations. 
B STRUCTURE 
One important aspect of the choice of administrative structure centers 
on the relationship between local government and the agency which is 
entrusted with urban development. The status of the organization may 
be represented by a simple diagram outlining the options found in the 
cities investigated for this study. 
Private 
Control 
Public 
Control 
ALTERNATIVE STATUSES OF DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 
CITY-RELATED AGENCY SEPARATE AGENCY 
A B 
c D 
"A" -- Privately controlled agencies functioning as part of the city admin-
istration are rare. An example which comes close to fitting the classification 
is the now-dissolved Denver Master Plan Committee which began in 1961 as a 
private organization set up by local businessmen and partially supported 
by the City. Its function was to develop a comprehensive plan for the City 
of Denver. Its membership was originally appointed by the Mayor and while 
private contributions soon became its sole support it had access to the 
technical staffs in the city administration. The Master Plan Committee 
suffered from poor leadership and limited powers and was dissolved in 1966. 
"B" -- Private development agencies are relatively common in the U.S.A. 
and Canada. Basically cu~Y corporation set up to redevelop an urban area 
which is not publicly financed or otherwise controlled falls under this 
category. For example, enabling legislation passed in Illinois as early 
as 1941 provided that any 3 residents of a city could form a private corpo-
ration for slum clearance in an area no smaller than 2 blocks or larger than 
160 acres. 
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The law further stipulated other necessary characteristics of the area 
under discussion, the relation of the corporation to affected residents 
and to ~~~7 agencies. A Missouri law aliows any city over 350,000 to 
acquire land and sell it to developers, the development being done by 
private corporations which may enjoy tax-abatement privileges as well. 
Under Massachusetts Law, development corporations receive tax incentives 
and powers of eminent domain, as long as certain conditions laid down by 
the city are met and there is a limited return on investment. In this 
instance, these private development corporations act as decentralized 
agents for carrying out the development plan. 
Private agencies are most often concerned with the development of relative-
ly small projects compared with the overall plans or needs of the city. 
It is not uncommon to find a number of such agencies co-operating with 
each other or with a public authority in the development of a large scale 
plan. Option nBu is almost always compatible with the other options. 
"C" -- Public, city-related agencies are also common. Urban renewal in 
Winnipeg at present is conductd under this type of administrative structure. 
Downtown redevelopment in Hamilton, Ontario was directed through this type 
of structure as is one of the most ambitious downtown development and 
slum clearance programs in the U.S.A., that of New Haven, Connecticut. 
Basically the structure consists of a Development Administrator who is 
responsible to the mayor or a council committee. The Administrator and 
his staff generally operate through contractors to accomplish planned 
projects rather than become directly involved in construction. 
Such branches of local government may also negotiate with private develop-
ment agencies. The prime drawbacks to this type of structure in the U.S.A. 
appear to be problems of fragmentation of authority, lack of flexibility 
and that of finance. City financing of urban renewal often requires the 
issuing of loans and bonds for resources which are in high demand by 
other city agencies. In order to shift urban development financing out 
from under city debt limits,provide more efficiency and avoid jurisdictional 
problems, option '~", the public development agency, is created. 
"D" -- The creation of single purpose administrative units, often called 
special districts or public authorities is becoming increasingly common 
in the U.S.A. One study noted that the growth of such districts between 
1957 - 1962 was on the order of 67%, comprising almost 30% of the local 
government bodies in the country. Special districts are neither new nor 
uncommo'il. 
In Canada the trend in local government has been uncertain with regard to 
the creation of s-uch authorities. On one r.and there is the natural tendency 
toward the use of special district agencies to overcome problems of juris-
diction at the local level. In Wi'ilnipeg ·the formation of a water authority 
a..""l.d a transit authority in the pas't ¥7ere indicative of this trend. On the 
other hand, so:ne Canadian cities have made tentative steps to reduce the 
n'tlr21ber of age:::1cies by the constitutior.:. of Me·tropolitan governments. The 
?rese~~ ?=o~:e~s of such super-authorities i~ local goverrunent situations 
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in Toronto and Winnipeg seeo to inciicate that these experiments were 
designed wi·thout a total cornrrd tment to the concept; the actual structures 
repre~e~~i~g ~ possible advance over the fragmented local scenes in the 
U.S.A., but not carried far enough to create a fundamentally new form 
of local government. This situation appears to have led to a situation 
where new special organizations are needed for the solution of urgent 
local problems. 
Special district agencies concerned with housing and urban development 
are relatively co~n in the U.S.A. They are often former housing and 
slum clearance agencies ~hich have been given broader powers. The use 
o£ special authoritie? in this area in Canada appears to be very rare. 
Housing corporations a:::-a becocing oore common, especially at the 
provincial level, but their concern appears to be primarily financial 
ra·ther than activity-oriented. 
Examples of urban development agencies may be found in the city studies 
above. See New York, Boston, Newark, Denver, etc. The compelling 
reasons for their creation are as follows: 
(1) To consolidate those powers required for development 
purposes in one place, thus eliminating the need to 
constantly harness a variety of agencies with different 
outlooks. 
(2) To provide for more speed and efficiency by giving such 
agencies more autonomy, freeing them from normal civil 
service rules, and giving sufficient powers of action and 
sufficient insulation from day to day political inter-
ventions to insure expeditious action. 
(3) To improve financing powers. 
(4) To integrate public and private resources and provide 
means whereby the private community can be recruited. 
The organizational form of such organizations is normally a Board of 
Directors appointed by the chief political officer, composed usually of 
private citizens with public officials as ex-officia members, an executive 
director charged with responsibility for operation and normally more an 
entrepreneur ty~e than a technical administrator, and a staff that is not 
subject to civil service ruleso 
A common occurrence is for development corporations or development 
au~horities tt~t are set up by local government to have a close tie-in 
with private ·development corporations, as exemplified in the Philadelphia 
arrangement between the ci·o::.y Redevelopment Authority a.."ld the private Old 
Philadelphia Corpora·tion. This partnership bet-ween public and private 
sepaz-ate agencies (ty;;es iji3uv and nDn in tb.e t3rpology) combines tl1e ad-
va.:.1.-.:ages of --~oth a:2G. is a p~rticularly effective means of including the 
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p=ivate community. Therefore in exam1n1ng possible structures for 
downtown development in Winnipeg, the arrangement of two corporations 
as done in Philadelphia, St. Louis, Minneapolis and elsewhere could be 
very instructive. 
C ENABLING LEGISLATION 
The nature of the constituting authority of a development agency has 
great implications for its role in the local political system, the 
respect which it commands and eventually the success of its program. 
Type"A"agencies are creatures of local business interests and city 
officials and are dependent upon the goodwill of both groups. The Denver 
example noted above was hampered by a lack of leadership, which is to 
be expected given the dual nature of control, and by a lack of power. 
Type"B"agencies are generally constituted under State or Provincial 
legislation, which has granted local authorities control over this form. 
Again the power of this type to effect development is quite limited, 
until city agencies have approved various aspects of the plan. In 
Chicago, for instance while State Law set down the conditions for con-
stituting a neighbourhood development corporation, numerous city agencies 
also exercised vetoes by virtue of their control over zoning, eminent 
domain, comprehensive planning and social services. Type"C"agencies 
are more fortunate in this regard as their activities are governed by 
city regulations and they enjoy a status equivalent to those agencies which 
hold the above-mentioned powers. Type"D"agencies are of two types with 
respect to status of enabling legislation. In both cases, the development 
agency is the creature of state legislation. However, on one hand the 
city itself is authorized to directly create the agency as a city-wide 
special purpose public corporation while on the other hand the agency may be 
created directly by the State legislature. Generally, this is done where 
there is a need to form an agency which can act across city boundaries 
in an urbanized area. The status of the agency becomes equivalent to 
that of a city itself, though only within the limits of the purpose of 
the agency. Normally, such legislation is passed where the geographical 
area of jurisdiction crosses city boundaries. 
D AREA Al'ID AGENCY TYPE 
There appears to be a relationship between the type of agencies discussed 
at the beginning of this analysis and their areas of jurisdiction. Type 
"A" agencies are quite rare and have few real powers. Generally their 
a::cea of jurisdic·tion is city-wide. Type "B" agencies have almost ex-
clusively created to handle projects which cover a number of city blocks, 
while Types "C" and "D" are found only -vdth a city-wide jurisdiction. 
Type "D" agencies also have been adapted to regional or State boundaries. 
Dade Countys which includes ~iami, Fla., and its suburbs has recently 
been endowed with such an agency. Some attempts have also been made in 
the San F::cancisco area to develop a regional transportation agency and a 
regional development agency has been discussed. The trend toward regional 
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authorities appears to be following a trend toward the amaigamation 
of city governments into larger units, primarily on a county basis. 
Metropolitan governments such as those of Winnipeg, Toronto and now 
Montreal are analogous to this trend. This trend in development 
agencies has been pushed ·to its logical conclusion in New York State 
with the constitution of the State Urban Development Corporation. 
The experience of cities under study is that agencies established to 
handle one specific task or project have a tendency to evolve into 
broader-based agencies, covering a wider area, with a greater assort-
ment of development objectives. This corresponds to the reality of 
modern urban planning where it is obvious that development inter-
ventions in one part of the city have an impact throughout the Metropolitan 
area. Thus the opportunity to establish a new form of agency for the 
implementation of a downtown plan may provide a good opportunity to 
create an organization that might eventually serve a variety of develop-
ment tasks in the metropolitan area. 
II ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS 
A EFFICIENCY .~\u DE~OC~~CY 
Where a program is unde~taken wh~ch is both technically complex and 
costly~ the timing of the projects is of crucial importance. In urban 
development, delays may cost a developer his profit, eliminating his 
incentive to participate and increasing waste in public expenditures. 
On the other hand, economic efficiency might be obtained only at the 
cost of sacrifici~g public responsibility. }~ important and complicated 
problem is to •wrork out an acceptable trade-off between efficiency and 
public responsibility before a development organization of any type is 
formed. 
The most common method of insuring accountability or responsibility is 
through the appointment of personnel. In the city-related public agency 
this method is most apparent, as the city council or mayor appoints the 
staff of the organization and they report to the elected officials. 
Often the top post in this department of the city administration is held 
by the incumbent "at the pleasure" of the council or mayor. 
Directors of the more autonomous agencies may also be appointed "at 
pleasure". though there is a tendency to associate autonomy with fixed 
terms of office. The appointment of Boards of Directors or Advisory 
Boards are also common where autonomous public agencies are used. The 
members of these boards may be appointed by either the Senior Government 
or by the Local Government Council. In general, membership is for a 
fixed term and representation on the board is accorded to most or all of 
the major public-private groups having an interest in the development 
process. This system removes the organization one step from direct 
responsibility to elected officials, with the purpose of giving it more 
independence and freedom. It also removes it from the normal functioning 
of city departments. 
Accountability through the control of personnel may also be pursued through 
the separation of the development agency's personnel from the civil 
service system. Such a designation places greater emphasis upon efficient 
and acceptable performance. In practice~ one also finds? that the executive 
directors of such organizations usually have close relations with the 
Mayor or Governor and there is a mutual set of interests developed in an 
informal manner. 
A second form of accountability is related to the financial activities of 
development organizations. The budgets of city-related organizations 
are obviously controlled by the elective city officials. In separate 
agencies, fin&~cia! control may be exercized through the power to grant 
or withold subidies , and through the control of powers to borrow or 
float bonds. Yuu"y such agencies in the U.S.A. were formed in order to 
allow for the circumvention of city debt l~its. These agencies were 
given the pov;rer to float bonds or borrow in other ways. The State and the 
city coc:..ld financially con::.rol these agencies by mea..~s of requiring 
g~.a.::a:r.::.:ees :.:or loc...J.s 2:nd by ::-ecr~J:..:::tng refe::enda on bonG. issues$ Urban 
de\TC~O?ille!:;.t i:c. S::... Lot:::..s, JY~issouri for inst:a:.1.ce 1.-J.as ~oeen carried on by 
means of bond issues floated only after referenda had been held to 
approve this action, while the Urban Development Corporation of New York 
receivad Q flat authorization from the State Legislature to borrow up to 
$1 billion. In Boston a form of control has been incorporated into the 
financing of private development corporations by requiring that stock in 
the corporations be first offered to property owners in the project area. 
A third method of insuring responsibility is through the monitoring of 
the activities of the agency. Private corporations under Illinois law 
as late as 1960 had to obtain the approval of 60% of the owners of property 
affected by renewal before submitting their plans to city officials for 
approval. Plan approval for public agencies of both types noted above 
is very common. Clearing and expropriation hearings, properly advertised 
and conducted may also allow for review of the activities of the agencies. 
A strong control over autonomous agencies is the separation of the 
planning function from the executing of a project. This leaves the 
elected city officials in control of the overall activities of the agency. 
While the office of ombudsman is relatively new in North America as a 
whole and Manitoba in particular, it would not seem unreasonable to 
empower this office with investigatory powers in any area of urban 
renewal or where any public power such as expropriation is used, regardless 
of the public or private nature of the body concerned. 
B AUTONOMY 
In spite of the homage paid to public participation and control over such 
activities as urban development, times occur when the need for fast 
effective action appears to be overwhelming. This sense of critical 
urgency may motivate an elected body into granting widespread powers to 
an autonomous agency which contravenes established social patterns and 
traditions. The New York Urban Development Corporation, with its vast 
borrowing power, authority to overrule local bylaws on zoning and housing 
standards and its insulation from public control is such an example. The 
U.D.C., however, has provisions for a business advisory group as well as 
various community advisory groups which ties it to control groups. Other 
development authorities do not have quite the same powers as the U.D.C. and are 
certainly limited in the territorial scope of their activity to one city. 
But, the marked pattern of most American cities is to grant a high degree 
of autonomy to their development agency or corporation. This means separate 
financial powers and the right to exercise power of eminent domain. They 
usually have some form of a separate Board of Directors, freedom from 
conventional public service rules, and free handling of day to day admini-
stration. 
C ACCESSIBILITY 
Regardless of the type of administrative organization an intervention for 
reasons of urb~• development into a community ~111 affect the social and 
economic fabric, along w1th the existing physical facilities. Those 
affec~ed by this cr~nge as well as those planning to benefit should be 
allowad various avenues of access to the process of decision-making. In 
~his way all concerned pa~ties are able to secure some satisfactions, even 
if only psychological ones, and the project itself gains greater likelihood 
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of success. 
There are numerous ways to gain access to the development agency. The 
most common method is through hearings held to discuss the plans and 
specific decisions being made for the development area. At present 
private developers are required to attend hearings in order to secure 
building permits and public agencies such as the Manitoba Hydro are also 
required to do so in certain cases. Since urban development tends to 
involve parts of society quite deeply, hearings are a useful avenue for 
promoting good adjustment. There are, however, definite limitations to 
the instrument of public hearings, as noted in an article by Jeffery 
Jowell. 
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The constitution of either Boards of Directors of appointed private 
citizens or of advisory boards at both the executive and project levels 
also facilitate adjustment of local interests and promotes co-ordination 
between public agencies and private corporations on aspects of projects 
where their co-operation is required. 
Such advisory boards tend to act as "bridges" between these organizations 
and the development agency, both influencing and being influenced by 
the agency. In areas of urban renewal, a recent move in many American 
cities is to have Community Boards, composed of local residents, which 
also provide control over and access to the development process. 
An improvement on the technique of Advisory Boards is that employed by 
the Old Philadelphia Corporation, the Downtown Council in Minneapolis 
and Civic Progress Inc. in St. Louis. These formal corporations 
devoted to downtown development, and paid for by private funds, provide 
a vehicle for mobilizing the various interests of the community in a 
very active way. As described in the case studies, these organizations 
work in close tandem with the public agency and provide an ongoing source 
of assistance, resources, ideas, criticism, and often undertake aspects 
of the development. 
Accessibility can thus be provided through a Board, broadly representative 
of the interests involved in downtown development, directly tied to the 
development corporation, or through a separate, corollory corporation 
which co-operates and co-ordinates its activities with those of the 
public agency. The experience of American cities is that both are used. 
The latter form, however, is particularly effective and useful when 
there is a well-defined business group in the city, willing to expend 
time and resources. If they become organized into separate development 
corporations they add to and greatly complement the capacities of the 
public agency. TI•ere are naturally close inter-connections between the 
two. For example, the President of the Old Philadelphia Corporation 
(private) also sits on the Board of the Philadelphia Redevelopment 
Authority (public) • 
.._. Jowell, Jeffrey • "Ti.1.e Linits of the Public Hearing as a Tool of Urban 
?lanning", Administrative Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, February 1969. 
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D FORMALIZATION 
The neeG fvr a formal developmental organization in terms of administrative 
efficiency is implied throughout this report. It is also worth noting 
the creation of a specialized body to deal with a particular problem 
serves an educat onal and a political function in the community. Briefly, 
such an action focuses public attention and interests upon the new 
agency and upon its functions. Identification of problems by means of 
the creation of a problem-solving agency is often half the job of 
solution. Further such identification may lead to an active community 
interest which transcends the bounds of the original problem. The effect 
of Expo '67 in the generation of national sentiment is a case in point. 
Thus the establishment of a corporation to deal with downtown develop-
ment may well have the effect of highlighting other urban issues. 
E LEADERSHIP 
The quality of personal leadership as an administrative requirement for 
successful urban development became more obvious as research progressed. 
The psychological climate surrounding a development project is of tremendous 
importance in determining the success of such a project and this climate 
is primarily created by the leadership of the responsible agency. The 
examples of New Haven, Connecticut, New York City and Philadelphia de-
monstrate the crucial tie between leadership and success. 
The successful leader is apparently a political or entrepreneur type and 
not a city planner, basically because the major tasks are those related 
to human relations and not physical construction. Edward Logue and 
William Rafsky can be cited as obvious examples. Leadership of the 
development corporation is required to attract support, negotiate with 
private interests, deal with different levels of government, and promote 
the project. To do this, the director must have a good deal of autonomy 
and freedom and be a person unafraid to use it. Only after these tasks 
have been executed can a leader realistically concern himself with the 
technical aspects of the program. An interesting comparison can be 
made between the unsuccessful efforts of Denver which lacked a "strong 
man" and other cities which succeeded because of effective direction 
from the top. 
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III SCOPE AND POWERS 
The scope and powers exercised by the development authority is an 
essential factor in determining the success or failure of development 
plans. Too often good plans fail or become bad projects because of in-
adequate powers possessed by the responsible authority or because there 
was a fragmentation in powers or because the jurisdiction in which the 
development powers could be used was too narrow. 
The scope of the development agency may be discussed in terms of geography 
and approach. A development agency may be given a frame of reference 
including the entire area of a city, from which it selects the most 
feasible projects oritcan be tied to a specific geographical area of the 
city from its inception. This variation may depend upon the need for 
development in the city; where the city is facing widespread deterioration 
the scope may be wide, while it may narrow if the task and the goals are 
of a more limited nature. Geographical scope should not be determined 
before the goals of development are determined since there is an inter-
relationship which exists within the entire urban area. Changes in one 
area will affect other areas. 
The scope of development agencies is often varied in terms of approach. 
An agency may include both planning and expenditing of development, or 
just one or the other. It may be an autonomous agency or one closely 
connected to the city government. There appears to be a trade-off in 
this area in that autonomy appears to promote faster physical movements 
(construction, clearing, etc.) whlle closer alliance to city government 
avoids suspicions or resentments by elected officials, and perhaps greater 
public control. 
The respresentation of interests in the development process, both planning 
and expediting, is probably the largest single complicating factor in 
urban redevelopment. There is no real public interest in this situation. 
Rather there is a broad range of intensely competing interests all of 
which demand to be heard. Some of these are as follows: 
a. People and businesses facing relocation - these are probably 
the most intensely interested people because of the impact of relocation. 
b. Interests involved in the actual operation of development 
projects - architects, businesses, developers are all interested in the 
possibilities of development and ways of corraling their interests are 
required. 
c. The wider downtown community. Business, financial establish-
ments, residents, large firms that are located in the downtown area are 
also or should be aware of the condition of the downtown and the prospects 
engendered by a development project. 
d. Intergovernmental interests - the r&~ge of tools and 
activities in renewal are so great that all levels of government are 
involved and are somewhat jealous of their prerogatives. 
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The successful integration of these and other interests is required if 
the development is to proceed in an effective way. The scope of the 
agency and the powers it uses must be decided in light of the particular 
arrangement of these interests in each individual city. For example, 
some cities have constructed highly centralized agencies with all-
encompassing powers to achieve a specific project, such as the Charles 
Centre in Baltimore. 
The Charles Centre Development Corporation, guided by a Board of 
Directors drawn from the private sector is organizing the assembly of 
land, arranging finances and construction and managing the marketing of 
a downtown redevelopment project, with very little reference to existing 
city government departments, but using full powers of government. 
This came about because of the mayor's deep frustration at the incessant 
time lags and squabbling between existing agencies. 
!n Philadelphia, on the other hand, there is more decentralization with 
powers shared between the Pl&~ning Commission, Redevelopment Authority 
and the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation, with relations between 
handled in a co-operative informal manner. 
The following describes the kind of powers exercised by development 
agencies under study. 
A POWER TO PLAN 
A development agency must first have some idea of what is desirable for 
the area. This is the planning function. It must be recognized that 
while planning is an ongoing process, some general concept of goals to 
be achieved must be retained from start to finish. Within this context 
much of the detail may vary according to conditions. Project planning is 
the first power required by a redevelopment agency. This means that 
agencies should not be rigidly held to a predetermined plan, but have the 
power to make changes without becoming involved in time-consuming changes 
in planning statutes by the local council or governing body. 
B POWER OF LAND 
The problem of acquiring and then using the necessary land for the project 
is most crucial. The major parts of this problem are price and timing. 
Land in the center of cities is valuable because of the available services 
and location near other industrial-commerical areas. It is also valuable 
due to the existence of speculators. Much land in downtown areas is over-
inflated due to its potentiality rather than its actual use. 
Development corporations in American cities are often forced into the 
la~dholding business because of the need to control land prices. Develop-
ment corporations may hold all of the following powers: land purchase, 
use of eminent domain, land holding, clearance, zoning power and tax 
abatement. Lhe financial situation of the development corporation may 
be such that it moves to purchase the land necessary for redevelopment. 
Such an activity is desireable not only for reasons of deflating prices 
but also for reasons of tining in the project itself. A common practice 
allied to land purchase is the writing do~ of land so as to enable the 
developer to reach a profit at a lower point than is normally relative 
to investment costs. Such a situation then enables the developer to pass 
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along benefits to the city as a whole in terms of smog control, land-
scaping, etc. or to the tenants of the development in terms of lower 
rents. 'l'ne latter is important where a central area must compete with 
the periphery for new firms. 
The use of the power of condemnation or eminent domain is important 
for purpose of assembling a coherent tract of iand for redevelopment 
purposes, for assembling such a tract at the opportune time and for 
evading much of the inflated price asked by speculators for the parcels 
in the tract. In the last case, eminent dorr~in (expropriation) may be 
considered as &~ alternative to extra financing and/or writing-down land 
costs. Canadian cities thus far have been wary of using this power for 
purposes of private redevelopment. But, there is no question, based 
on the American experience that such a power is necessary to avoid a host 
of time-consuming problems provided that some controls and accountability 
are exercised. 
Landholding is a method of spurring metropolitan growth which has been 
neglected by most cities. Basically it consists of acting to purchase 
land before its speculative value becomes known and holding it until 
its economic value as a potentially developable site becomes apparent. 
Land banks entail some loss of tax revenue while the land remains in 
public hands, though some of this may be cancelled by future profits 
on sales. The possibility of loss of this method is comparable to that 
of purchasing and writing down by a redevelopment agency at a later time. 
Clearance of land also requires financing but acts to make the timing 
of developments more secure. It appears to be often a precondition for 
developers' contracts. 
C ZONING POWER 
Zoning power, where such power is not diluted by continual exceptions 
and variances constitutes a useful planning tool. Basically, zoning 
has acted in redevelopment projects as a retarding and complicating 
agency, especially when a branch of the government not connected with 
the development agency controls this power. Increasingly the American 
eA~erience is to provide development agencies with the power to override 
zoning regulations, subject to certain conditions and procedures. 
D TAX POWER 
Tax-abatement power is important in the attraction of developers and 
commercial and industrial organizations. Like the writing down of land 
it acts to reduce the costs of the developer. Two forms of tax abatement 
have been increasingly used in the cities under study. One deals with 
lower rates or moratoria on building and land within the project area. 
A second form concerns the revenue due rather than the replacement cost 
of construction. This form represents a type of loss of profit-sharing 
by t~e developer an6 the c~ty. Tax-abatement may also reduce the loss 
caused by delays iri C.evelo?~ew.t programs and :o.ay o::fset t.he advan'tages 
of cr~eap lanci ar:d taxes found crt t~'l.e pe-rip~1.ery of cc:1.e cit:y o Furt'r.a.ennore, 
tbe power to a.IL.eliorate or adjust tfie applicatio-:1 of ·cax laws can. be 
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useful in promoting new forms and styles of building. Obviously this 
is a power that elected councils would be wary of passing on to a 
developwtac agency. But certain enabling tax provisions could be 
passed that would be used at the discretion of the agency. 
E DEVELOPMENT POWERS 
Once land has been reserved for the development project, the problem of 
finding a developer for the project arises. Development may be undertaken 
by either public or private organizations. Normally the public develop-
men·t agency does not actively participate as a developer as well, though 
such a procedure is possible and may be desireable especially where a 
large public grant for such purposes are made available. Private organi-
zations which control large amounts of risk capital are probably the 
most common sponsors of redevelopment projects. Banks and insurance 
organizations are prime examples. The developer acquires the land from 
the development agency and constructs the buildings to meet the needs of 
the city and at the same time the qualifications of leaseholders. This 
organization therefore handles the construction, rental and maintanance 
of the project, either singly or in combination with other developers. 
Public involvement will inevitably occur with respect to various services 
to the project, such as schools, transportation, utilities, etc. 
One area which is often involved with public agencies is the problem of 
parking. Another consideration must be the eventual management of the 
project, particularly if space has been used for public amenities. The 
pattern of American cities in dealing with this question follows two 
modes. There is the pattern in Boston, St. Louis, where subsidiary 
private development corporations can be set up subject to overall plan 
and authority of the public agency. They are able to use certain powers 
of government such as eminent domain, and receive tax incentives. They 
continue as managers of the project. A second model is that of Philadelphia and 
Minneapolis where through separate organizations, i.e. the Old Philadelphia 
Development Corporation, Downtown Council, there is a private development 
interest brought into the project at its earliest stages and the eventual 
financial arrangements are worked out in co-operation. The Old Philadelphia 
Development Corporation also has taken on the job of marketing and managing 
parts of projects. The obvious interest in both cases is to insure that 
the private interests are party to the downtown development scheme, right 
from the beginning, and are not left out of the picture until plans 
and programmes are made, which has been the tendency in most urban renwwal 
schemes in Canada. 
One of the critical factors in the similarity or dissimilarity between 
plans and results is the time factor. Delays in financing, land parcel 
assembly, provision of services and especially bureaucratic approval of 
construction activities may cause the failure or the distortion of projects. 
This one fact alone has been a major reason in prompting the creation of 
development agencies or corporations which package together all the 
necessary powers, and act as one source of authority and decision. The Urban 
Development Corporation of New York is a prine example of an organization 
buil·;: fcT speed.. Or..:.e of the ultiz;;.ate rationales;) ti'"le:refore, for a separate 
Cevelopment corporation must. resici.e on it.s a'bi:Li·ty to :.:;ossess tb.e re-
~ui::-ed poweTs ar1d l1.ave t:""le pe:rsonr..el wh.o caw.~ v..:se ·tb.ern. ir.l a flexible, 
eff!cien·;:, imaginative way. 
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F FINANCIAL POWERS 
The fincu1~ial relationships between various levels of government and 
development agencies are often complex and subject to considerable 
misunderstanding. The development agency is primarily a co-ordinating 
and expediting body and as such must be considered for financial 
purposes as a service organization. Profits, losses,costs and benefits 
must be considered in light of the entire governmental situation, not 
just in the accounts of the agency. Normally a development agency's 
accounts will show a loss of money, but this is not to be confused with 
the financial nature of the projects at hand. 
The budgets of most agencies reflect their relative autonomy from other 
governmental bodies. The most autonomous agencies enjoy the privilege 
of issuing bonds up to a certain limit which are automatically guaranteed 
by the city or, if one wishes to avoid overloading municipal credit 
capabilities by the State or Province. In the U.S.A., the interest 
received on such bonds is normally free from income tax, allowing cities 
and development agencies to offer them at relatively low rates of interest. 
The availability of money for such bonds has rarely been low, except for 
the recent inflationary spiral. Some States have also authorized special 
bonds which are to be amortized through revenues generated by the tax 
appreciation on the project construction. This form of bond works 
against the tax abatement concept discussed above. Independent arrange-
ments to borrow Federal public monies may also be permitted. 
Often operating budgets for the agencies, costs of providing public 
amenities for projects and some other project costs are granted by the 
city. Further, the State and the Federal governments in the U.S.A. may 
act to defray either city or agency net project costs by means of 
underwriting a fixed proportion (usually 2/3 if Federal or 1/2 if State) 
of these costs. Net costs means the loss to the agency after the project 
land is leased or sold. These costs are especially great in the case of 
a write-down on the land, and where land is cleared. Grants and subsidies 
of this nature may be closely controlled where individual decisions are 
required or the autonomy of the agency may be preserved by means of 
assuring a constant subsidy based on a fixed percentage of all agency net 
costs incurred in its projects. 
The agency itself may generate its own revenue from the sale of services 
and leasing land and buildings where the project construction is publicly 
financed. 
Normally, the problem of financing a given project depends more on the 
quality of the proposals then on scarcity of money. Good projects, well 
conceived and expedited, have little trouble with money. 
In spite of the deficits commonly incurred by development agencies, the 
public authorities generally stand to make a profit. Tax appreciation 
on urban develop~ent is normally high, running 3 to 4 times the original 
tax payments in the U.S.A. Amortization of public investments may be 
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completed inside of 10 years, long before most bonds are due. In terms 
of the local economy further advantages can be expected in that normally 
each dollar invested in development projects by public authorities 
generates between $4 and $6 of private investment. This means more 
jobs, increased tax returns and more secondary investment. Computing 
profit and loss by public authorities is therefore quite difficult. 
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IV EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
A COMl~~ITY RELATIONS 
Relations with the general public are commonly divided by development 
agencies into two types. The first type consists of relations with a 
specific part of the public, ie. those directly affected by development. 
This segment of the public includes those whose businesses stand to gain 
or lose from urban development projects, the developers of the area in 
question, city officials who must respond to an increased demand for 
services or, conversely, who may benefit from increased tax revenue, and 
householders who may be displaced. Good community relations in this 
area are a function of open communication lines and an opportunity for 
involvement. Techniques used may include hearings on proposals and the 
constitution of advisory committees composed of representatives of the 
affected groups. The more advanced methods being employed have been 
cited repeatedly. These include 1) a development corporation which has 
as its governing body, a board representative of various interests (Baltimore), 
2) parallel private organizations or development groups that have a close 
working relationship with the development agency, and in fact, are 
instrumental in many of its decisions, as well as having powers of their 
own (Philadelphia, Minneapolis), 3) separate, subsidiary·development 
corporations, either composed of community residents, or business firms, 
which undertake particular parts of the project, work under a general 
plan and enjoy special benefits (Boston, St. Louis). 
A second type of public relations is concerned with the general public. 
Good relations at this level are important for the development organization 
politically since its programs may come under heavy attack from affected 
interest groups. 
General public relations are important also in terms of the image of the 
development project itself. Development projects are generally under-
taken in areas which have declined relative to surrounding or nearby 
areas. This may mean that a slum is cleared or that a neglected and under-
developed downtown area is selected for a new residential and commercial 
project. In either case, the "image" of the area must be improved if 
the project is to succeed financially once the process of physical 
construction is finished. The responsibility of the development agency 
may formally be minimal in this regard, but experience indicates that 
if an original project experiences difficulty due to an inadequate "image", 
the development agency is likely to experience great difficulty in 
selling a subsequent project to the same or other developers. 
Good public relations may also be used by the development agency in a 
broader context. Well-publicized successes in area development can lead 
to increased interest on the part of other developers and the community 
at large, in the further enhancing of the quality of life in the city. 
The development agency acts as a psychological catalyst for the community 
as a whole, demonstrating that existing conditions can possibly be 
changed and forming public opinion and action to promote such change. 
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...a...gain, the existence of auxiliary "spin-off" corporations and boards 
provide support to this psychological climate. In Philadelphia, for 
example, ~he Old Philadelphia Development Corporation (OPDC) assists 
the Development Authority in cutLing red tape, promoting the goals of 
the agency and undertakes active promotion of center city improvement. 
The board is composed of influential businessmen who exercise their 
connections with government and industry in this regard. In St. Louis 
separate corporations were set up to publicize development programs and 
to sell the agency bonds. 
B INTERGOVE~~NTAL RELATIONS 
One of the most critical problems facing any form of development agency 
is that of maintaining a relationship with the various government bodies 
whose co-operation is necessary to the rapid and efficient completion 
of its projects. Tnis problem may be approached as in New York by the 
creation of an agency such as the Urban Development Corporation which 
can override local by-laws, zoning restrictions and other manifestations 
of local authority. A second conventional approach is the integration of 
the development agency into the city administration thus coupling local 
authority to the agency through institutional means. The practice 
followed where separate public development corporations exist has been 
toward the creation of boards of directors and/or advisory boards which 
provide for representation of local agencies whose powers may affect 
the quick implementation of projects. In this way, the private developers 
can avoid dealing with a variety of agencies for zoning permissions, 
new services, use of eminent domain, etc. Such co-ordination of public 
authority also provides a useful service to developers who may present 
projects outside the project areas. The provision of a single govern-
mental contact point for an overall consideration of proposed projects 
constitutes a cheap fina~cial incentive to outside investors, the time 
saved in co-ordinated negotiation resulting in savings to investors. 
There is an added difficulty, however, when the various agencies come 
from different jurisdictions of government. This can result in certain 
intergovernment conflicts which can paralyse the operation of the Board. 
Another alternative is to have the governing board composed of private 
individuals with the development corporation having sufficient powers that 
it need not overly rely on existing government bodies. This was the case 
in Baltimore. 
A great asset in dealing with inter-governmental relations in American 
cities has been the existence of the separate, private organizations such 
as OPDC. One of its important functions is to act as a buffer between 
the different levels of government, using its good offices to iron out 
difficulties and maintain close contact. 
In Yunneapolis the Downtown Council provides the function of liaison 
between the private sector and the various levels of government. This 
function of inter-gover~ental relations is performed either through 
~nformal contact or is institutionalized through a system of representation. 
In Denver, members of city council, private cevelopers, realtors, financiers 
anG. planners are re?resenteG. on adviso::-y co:m:r.ittees. 'I'he same man can 
be a ~ember of the DowntoWTl Denver Improvement Association, the Master Plan 
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Committee, bank president and president of the Chamber of Commerce. 
Inter-governmental relations are effected by a system of representation 
of all concerned groups and by multiple membership on these groups. 
Needless to say, the experience of the cities under study indicates 
that the creation of some form of consolidated development agency, with 
sufficient powers, and good leadership has been one of the ways that 
inter-government disputes or conflicts have been transcended in the 
interest of renewing and improving the urban environment. Certainly the 
case of the UDC in New York indicates how far the State Government was 
prepared to go in putting together an effective instrument of urban 
development. 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing examination, certain salient observations emerge. 
PROCESS 
The basic purpose of a development agency is the improvement of the 
conditions of life of part of urban society, primarily through the 
restructuring of the physical environment. New residential and 
recreational patterns, more jobs and better access to markets are all 
part of this improvement. 
Development is change. It is a breaking of old patterns in favour of 
new ones. An organization created to promote urban development, 
therefore must be first of all designed to be an innovative or 
entreprenurial one. Our research has suggested that certain elements 
are necessary if such a bias is to be built into an organization. 
ENTREPREWuRIAL ACTIVITY 
The impact of private entrepreneurs in the cases of urban development 
set out at the beginning of this report is great. Where monetary 
profit is felt to exist, private entrepreneurs will take an interest 
in development; however monetary profit cannot be the sole guiding 
force in social change. Social, non-monetary "profit" must also be 
considered. Co-operation between public development agency and private 
developers can best insure a beneficial mix of the two kinds of profit. 
Such co-operation should not be left to random selection, but should 
be planned or even institutionalized. Increasingly North American cities 
through the use of joint quasi public-private corporations or tandem 
arrangements between private development corporations and public 
authorities are integrating the efforts of business and government in 
downtown development. Each constitutes certain essential points of view and 
does notview the other as an opponent. A formalization of private-
public entrepreneurship must thus be provided and directed towards the 
improvement of the quality of life in the urban area. 
A second problem related to public entrepreneurship is the separation of 
innovation from maintenance. Organizations tend toward stressing one 
function over another and it would appear that the separation of main-
tenance of completed projects from development activity should be made 
clear beforehand. This simply means that the agency which initiates 
and implements the project should not administer, but transfer authority 
to the respective agencies that normally look after parking, parks, etc. 
I AUTONOMY 
Tne separation of maintenance and innovation is generally made at the 
policy level also, where ongoing urban government is separated from the 
development agency. Even in cases where a development administrator is 
attached to the city administration his position has been granted a fair 
degree of autonomy. In the case of the specialized public agency, autonomy 
is ce:'.l.tral to its existance. This fact was repeateC.ly stressed - that 
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the activities of urban development require capacities different from 
those of normal government activities. Particularly important is the 
need t0 ~e~ruit personnel and give them a freedom of operation that 
does not fit conventional public administration patterns. 
Leadership 
An entrepreneurial organization requires a specialized type of leadership. 
Tne importance of good leadership in the case of urban development 
cannot be overstated. In all the cases of success and failure investigated 
in our research this factor appeared as a most critical one. Development 
agencies have succeeded where the leadership was oriented towards the 
co-ordination and direction of people and not towards the technical 
aspects of development. Previous experience in urban planning or con-
struction does not appear to be as useful as experience in such areas as 
labour relations, politics or corporation management. Urban development 
is not so much construction as social change and leadership of an urban 
development agency must concentrate on handling the resulting social 
tensions and demands. 
Timing 
In terms of attaining the goal of development, a public agency is 
primarily responsible for the co-ordination of all parties concerned 
in such a way as to achieve a socially beneficial physical change. To 
a great degree, success is dependent upon correct timing of the parts of 
a project. Public amenities must be furnished to coincide with private 
facilities. In the broad sense "amenities" may include the need to 
provide various legal permissions to private agencies (zoning, plan 
approval, etc.) when the finance is available to begin work. Delays 
in approvals and more concrete amenities such as public services may both 
render an undertaking unprofitable, thus deterring further development. 
A development agency must be provided with the means of effectively 
reducing risk attributable to such delays, if private money is to be 
attracted. 
II STRUCTURE 
Certain essential points concerning the structure of development agencies 
have been noted in our research. Without a formal structure and an 
assured position in the web of public organizations and governmental 
departments the promotion of development cannot be carried out. 
Enabling Legislation on Development Corporations 
Authority for the creation of a development agency, if it is a separate 
body, must come from the Province. Such legislation indicates the 
interest of the highest authorities in the area in the problem of urban 
development and serves to focus public attention upon this activity. 
Development may also be promoted by the Metropoli·can Corporation. through 
t~e craation. of a new ?OSt of Development Administration to co-ordinate 
~::-te -cse o'£ existing powers. Such enabling legisla·tion may also want ':o 
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provide for the creation of quasi public-private development corporations, 
as was noted exist under Massachusetts, Missouri, Maryland and Illinois 
legisla~ion. This would permit the creation of development corporations, 
sponsored either by business groups or community residents which could 
take on aspects of urban development in "the public interest", subject 
to certain conditions, but aided by incentives and the use of certain 
government powers. The possibility of establishing such forms of 
development corporations extends the flexibility of the public develop-
ment authority and provides a means of mobilizing private resources. 
Sponsoring Body 
wnen the sponsoring body for the agency is the State or Province, the 
status of the agency in the hierarchy of urban governments and public 
organizations is high. The agency also enjoys more autonomy than when 
it is created under the aegis of city authority. 
Jurisdiction 
State-sponsored autonomous public agencies are, as far as our research 
indicates, entirely city-wide in jurisdiction. Some extend into counties 
and one is state-wide. There is no example of a smaller jurisdiction 
except in the case of the Manitoba Centennial Corporation. In some 
cases, public development authorities have centered on just one aspect of 
development, such as a downtown improvement scheme, but their ultimate 
activities have not be de-limited. It may be; considering the present 
state of flux in the organization of local government in Winnipeg, that 
the establishment by the Provincial government of a corporation specifically 
instructed to handle downtown development, but not exclusively so, could 
act as a forerunner for the kinds of institutions that might emerge 
to handle urban development on a Metropolitan scale. Certainly it's 
immediate establishment as a creature of the province - but with representation 
from various local interests would provide the Greater Winnipeg area 
with a new instrument for urban change, and one that would not necessarily 
have to be linked with existing arrangements of local government. 
Scone 
The scope of any agency appears to be a function of its history, resources, 
powers and the needs of the city. In the U.S. such agencies have grown 
out of an urban renewal background, enjoy autonomous financing, a varied 
extent of powers and are often faced with very pressing urban needs. Their 
scope of activities has tended to be broad, encompassing slum clearance, 
housing rehabilitation, industrial and commercial redevelopment. In short, 
they are involved in a total effort to upgrade the entire community. 
Powers 
The most obvious structural feature incorporated into successful develop-
ment agencies, or recommended for the improvement of less successful ones 
is the consolidation of public powers related to urban development. These 
powers are as follows: 
Autonomous Financing 
Land Acquisition, Clearance, and Disposal 
Ongoing Planning 
Zoning 
Limited Tax Abatement Powers 
Building Standards 
Consolidation need not mean that the agency need formally hold all of 
these powers, but it does mean that the agency has access to those other 
governmental bodies that do and that the agency may secure reasonably 
swift approval of all aspects of construction and operating and that its 
recommendations be considered as the most important single influence 
in decision-making. The relationship between the control of powers and 
the realization of good timing and the maintenance of autonomy suggest 
that some form of these powers be incorporated into the overall structure 
of the agency. As previously noted the transference of such powers, 
particularly those related to land, to a development agency which may use 
them to secure holdings for private development is a significant departure 
from the Canadian Experience. The practice under urban renewal projects 
is very awkward and cumbersome, and of course, only applies in urban 
renewal areas. Obviously such powers must be used with care and account-
ability. But, they are essential if the objective is to provide effective 
land assembly and development and avoid time-consuming and expensive 
delays for the private developers. 
III EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
In spite of its orientation as an innovative body an urban development 
agency must maintain relations with the existing community. Such relations 
serve to reassure society that change is controlled and worthwhile. 
"Bridging" and Representation 
The most important finding in this area of relations with the rest of 
society in our research was the ubiquitousness of the practice of "bridging". 
Urban development agencies everywhere are careful to provide auxiliary 
bodies which contain representatives of organizations and interests 
which may be affected by development or who are in a position to affect 
the nature and tempo of change. These bodies act to explain to local. 
governments and interest groups in the city the rationale and the goals 
of the agency, so that the value of such work is acknowledged. They 
also serve to transmit the concerns of the organizations and interests 
to the agency so that an accurate estimate of the social scene may be gathered. 
The importance of such organizations as the Old Philadelphia Corporation, 
Civic Progress Inc. in St. Louis, Downtown Council, cannot be over-
emphasized. They serve to mobilize significant community resources, assist 
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in the shaping of plans and programs to fit what is realistic and possible, 
help arrange financing,developers and marketing, and at times take on 
actual parts of the program. They are not advisory boards, but have 
real influence and power mainly because of the quality of the people who 
belong. 
A basic pattern to insure a proper co-ordination and integration of 
efforts is to have some overlap between membership on the governing board 
of the development agency and that of the private development group. 
Yet another occurrence of equal merit in several cities has been the 
emergence of neighbourhood councils or organizations in affected develop-
ment areas which take on some responsibilities for shaping the program, 
and representing the interests of iocal residents. This is more usual 
when there is an existing residential community that will be undergoing 
renewal. 
Finally, any development agency would find work much easier if there 
is widespread support from the general community. There are a variety of 
techniques for exposing the plan and soliciting public interest, and 
they must be considered as essential to the process of development as 
any of the other aspects. 
Intergovernmental Relations 
Relations with other governmental bodies are of prime importance as they 
may determine the success or failure of projects through the exercize or 
withholding of their own unique powers. Effective relations require 
some sort of representation. The pattern followed by cities in this 
study is to have representatives of various agencies sit on the governing 
board as ex-officia members, usually in a minority to the appointed 
private citizen members. A pattern such as this might be useful in the 
Winnipeg context, again considering the uncertainty of present local 
arrangements. The establishment of a Development Corporation by the 
province could include representatives from the different levels of 
government. An additional form of representati~n could be a specific 
Board of Advisory Experts, drawn from the relevant departments of local 
government. Tne only other alternative is to adopt the concept of the 
Urban Development Corporation in the state of New York, where it possessed 
such a degree of autonomous powers, that local governments had no 
recourse but to accept its development proposals. 
SUMMARY 
Our research indicates that a public development agency, as suggested 
by the Downtown Development Plan, should incorporate the following ideas: 
1) Provincial enabling legislation for the creation of a 
development corporation and perhaps subsidiary bodies 
2) Autonomous agency status 
3) Metro~ide jurisdiction 
4) Consolidation of those powers under single direction which 
are required for the proper packaging of a development project, with 
proper safeguards and control 
5) Close co-operation with developers and business interests, 
perhaps in constitutionalized form 
6) A representative Board of Control 
7) Effective agency leadership 
Such an agency would be equipped to deal not only with the restricted 
scope of the Broadway - St. Mary development, but might in time integrate 
this development with the rest of the dovmtown area and with the urban 
area as a whole. 
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2) A second step in the examination would be on-the-spot 
investigation of existing development corporations and 
interviews with their officials, board members, developers, etc. 
This could be done in conjunction with an investigation we w re 
planning in several American cities in mid February to use for our 
urban redevelopment project which is alre dy underway. 
3) The subsequent data, information and assessment would then 
be compiled and translated in terms of the Winnipeg Downtown 
Development Project. This would, thus, entail some work on the 
objectives, plans, projections, and attitudes of various interested 
parties in Winnipeg such as other levels of government, private 
developers, financial institutions. This information would be 
matched with the analysis of other cities to develop the kind of 
development corporation that fits Winnipeg's needs, but based upon 
the best working experience of other corporations. This could 
conceivably be finished by the end of March if an immediate start 
was made. 
C) Resources: This is a simple study, requiring analysis of 
documentation, much of which is already possessed by IUS, some 
travel costs and computing expenses; and staff time for analysis and 
interview, and writing. Depending on the time that is required, costs 
would be moderate. 
D) Results: Such a study could give Metro Corporation the kind of 
information and assessment that would enable it to build upon the 
experience of others and create a new form of community-governmental 
machinery for the reconstruction of the downtown area. It is a good 
opportunity for practical innovation. 
